ABSTRACT Government subsidies can supplement R&D investment within pharmaceutical firms and strengthen industry knowledge spillovers effectively. Based on the inter-firm spillovers, a differential game model is established to investigate the government subsidy strategies under the different innovative drug R&D strategies of pharmaceutical firms. With the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equitation, the optimal R&D investment, the pharmaceutical technical levels, and the optimal benefits are obtained under the strategies of no pharmaceutical firms conduct R&D innovation, one side innovates alone and R&D cooperation. It can be concluded that the R&D investment of pharmaceutical firms and the effort level of the government is positively related to the technical level and their comprehensive benefits, while it is a negative correlation to the cost coefficient. In addition, an increase in spillover coefficient produces an increase in government subsidy. Furthermore, when the spillovers are low, the government should give a higher subsidy to the strategy of R&D cooperation. As the spillovers increase, the government should allocate more subsidies to pharmaceutical firm who conduct independent R&D of innovative drugs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Innovative drugs has been defined as the drugs with proprietary intellectual property rights. Innovative drugs are of great significance to China's construction of innovative countries. The R&D of innovative drugs will effectively break the dependence on imports and improve the accessibility and affordability of drugs. In order to encourage the creation of drugs with independent intellectual property rights and reduce the dependence on innovative foreign drugs, the ''Special New Drug Creation Special Project'' was established in China's medium and long-term national science and technology major projects. In addition, the ''Health China 2030'' Planning Outline and the ''Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Examination and Approval System to Encourage Drug Medical Device Innovation'' have led to the unprecedented development of innovative drug R&D. However, thanks to the R&D of innovative drugs requires high investment funds, accompanied by high risks and longterm characteristics, the R&D of innovative drugs is seriously
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insufficient. Furthermore, related research shows that pharmaceutical firms have obvious technical spillovers in drug development [1] . The spillovers makes it impossible for firms that conduct innovative drug R&D to obtain the full benefits of R&D results, which greatly weakens the enthusiasm of pharmaceutical firms for innovation drugs R&D.
In order to accelerate the development of innovative drugs and solve the problem of insufficient innovation power of pharmaceutical firms, the government has explicitly proposed to encourage pharmaceutical firms to carry out R&D activities on innovative drugs in the form of providing R&D subsidies. Government subsidies are an effective supplement to the firm's internal R&D investment [2] , at the same time, the existence of spillovers has led to government subsidy policies could not effectively promoting pharmaceutical firms to carry out innovative drug R&D activities. However, existing research shows that promoting technology spillovers of similar firms in the industry is conducive to improving the overall technical level of the industry [3] . Therefore, under the premise of considering the existence of technology spillovers, it is of great value to study how to formulate a reasonable government subsidy policy to promote pharmaceutical firms VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ to carry out R&D innovation and improve the overall innovation ability of China's pharmaceutical industry. Our work builds on and contributes to the previous literature on spillovers, government subsidies and innovative management in the pharmaceutical sector. First, we begin by briefly reviewing recent research regarding spillovers. Several papers focus on the impact of spillovers on the economy [4] - [8] . In addition, Some scholars have studied the impact of spillovers on innovation [9] - [17] . Some scholars believe that the existence of spillovers will increase social welfare [9] , while the internalization of spillovers will reduce social returns [13] . According to the study of Voutsinas et al., the total and private R&D expenditure appear to have a positive effect on total and business innovation [17] .
More related to our study, several scholars have investigated R&D and innovation of pharmaceutical firms under the government's innovative drug R&D subsidies. At present, there are few studies on the government subsidy strategy in the pharmaceutical industry, but we can see some research results on technological innovation and government subsidy strategies in other contexts [18] - [51] . Klette and Møen found that government subsidies contribute to reduce the investment costs and risks, and thus have an incentive effect on the R&D activities of firms [44] . However some other scholars have reached different conclusions. David et al. proved that government subsidies have a crowding-out effect on R&D investments of firms based on the theory of supply and demand [46] . Wallsten also obtained similar conclusions through the study of crowding-out effect theory [51] . Although scholars have studied government subsidies and firm decisions in various fields, the effectiveness of government subsidies is an area of ongoing research with few conclusive results. In addition, to our knowledge, few researches have been done on government subsidies and decisions of innovative drug R&D in pharmaceutical firms. Due to the public nature of the drug itself, the high complexity of drug discovery and innovation, and the multiple interests of the drug market, research results on government subsidies in other fields have little reference for the pharmaceutical field. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate government subsidies and R&D decisions of firms in the pharmaceutical field. Furthermore, the research on this kind of problem in the research method mostly uses static game to study, and does not take into account the change of state variables and the change of the other party's strategy with the state change. The improvement of the technical level of the pharmaceutical industry is a process of continuous change, so the research under the dynamic framework is more realistic. Differential game is an academic tool that deals with the conflicting, competition or cooperation issues of parties or parties in a continuous period of time. It is an important dynamic game model [52] . Consequently, this paper aims to base on the inter-firm spillovers, a differential game model is established to investigate the government subsidy strategies under the different innovative drug R&D strategies of pharmaceutical firms. Through a comparative analysis of the game equilibrium solution and the optimal returns of all parties, the influencing factors of the government subsidy policy and the optimal subsidy strategy are obtained. In such a context, this study seeks to address the following questions:
• How does the spillovers affect the choice of innovative drug development strategies for pharmaceutical firms?
• What is the optimal innovative drug development strategy for pharmaceutical firms under the spillovers?
• Based on the spillovers, what kind of R&D behavior does the government subsidize to maximize social welfare? What is the best amount of government subsidy in different cases?
The rest of the paper is organized in such a way that the second part is the model description, the third part describes the R&D strategies of pharmaceutical firms, the fourth part is comparative and analysis, the fifth part of the paper is the conclusion and policy implications and provides suggestions for future research.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The systems we consider include government, pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2. Pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 can increase their pharmaceutical technology level through the R&D investment and the government's efforts to obtain greater corporate profits. Assume that the R&D investment of pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 is expressed as E 1 (t) and E 2 (t) to enhance the pharmaceutical technology level of their own. The government's efforts for pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 are E G1 (t) and E G2 (t). The instantaneous costs paid by pharmaceutical firm 1, pharmaceutical firm 2 and local governments for the development of the pharmaceutical industry can be rewritten as:
where
is the R&D effort carried out at time t about the game subject, and µ X (X = 1, 2, G) is a positive parameter.
The technical level of the pharmaceutical industry can be improved through the investment and efforts of pharmaceutical firms and the government for the pharmaceutical industry. Accordingly, the instantaneous technical level functions are L 1 (t) and L 2 (t). The technical level of the pharmaceutical firms evolve over time as described by the following kinematic equation:
where the ε and δ are the degree of influence of the efforts of the government and pharmaceutical firms on the level of industrial technology, that is, the coefficient of influence of the technical level, while parameter ε > 0, δ > 0. Parameter θ > 0 is a constant depreciation rate measuring the instantaneous decrease in productive efficiency due to the ageing of technology.
At the time t, the profits of pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 are π 1 (t) and π 2 (t). Accordingly, the profits of pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 can be rewritten as follow:
Parameter α > 0, β > 0, > 0,represent the influence of local government, pharmaceutical firms and technology level on the efficiency of the pharmaceutical industry, respectively. That is, the impact coefficient of the pharmaceutical industry. (The following is convenient for writing to omit time t).
III. MODEL DIFFERENT R&D STRATEGIES OF PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
In this section, we explore the game analysis between the two pharmaceutical firms and the government under three different R&D strategies in the context of the government's provision of innovative subsidies: neither side innovates, one side innovates alone and R&D cooperation.
A. NEITHER SIDE INNOVATES
Under the government's innovative drug R&D subsidies, pharmaceutical firms take into account their own level of R&D capabilities, the spillovers, and the benefits of successful drug R&D, etc. Then they will develop their own R&D strategies. When pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 have rationally analyzed that the benefits of R&D of innovative drugs are less than the benefits of maintaining the status, there will be no drug innovation R&D activities, that is, neither side will innovate. Since no pharmaceutical firms conduct innovative drug R&D activities in this part, there is no government subsidy. In addition, since the two pharmaceutical firms do not carry out innovative R&D, there is no spillovers. In this setting, firms adopt a strictly noncooperative behavior in choosing both the output levels and the R&D efforts, each firm operating its own R&D division. The benefits of the pharmaceutical industry are distributed between the government and the pharmaceutical firms, and the government obtain φ i (0 ≤ φ i ≤ 1, i = 1, 2), the pharmaceutical firms obtain 1 − φ i . Throughout the game, firms discount future profits at the common and constant discount rate r > 0, and the government has the same discount rate as pharmaceutical firms.
The objective function of the pharmaceutical firms can be rewritten as:
The objective function of the government can be rewritten as:
Model contains control variables E G1 (t), E G2 (t), E 1 (t), and E 2 (t), state variables L 1 (t) and L 2 (t). The remaining parameters are constants greater than zero and are not related to time.
Proposition 1: Under the strategy that pharmaceutical firms do not carry out innovative activities, the three-party static feedback Nash equalization strategies are:
Proof: In order to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, the inverse induction method is adopted. Suppose there is a continuous bounded differential benefit function
, and L 1 ≥ 0, L 2 ≥ 0 both satisfy the HJB can be rewritten as:
We consider the first order partial derivatives of E 1 and E 2 for the right end parts of (10) and (11), respectively, and make them equal to 0. We can obtain:
The government can predict that pharmaceutical firms will choose their input function according to formulas (11) and (12) . Therefore, the government can determine its own efforts according to the rational choice of pharmaceutical firms. The local government's HJB can be rewritten as:
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Substituting (11)- (12) into (13) . Then, we consider the first order partial derivatives of E G1 and E G2 for the right end part of (13) ,and make them equal to 0. We can obtain:
Substituting (11)- (12) and (14)- (15) into (9), (10) , and (13). We can obtain:
From (16)- (18) we can obtain, the linear optimal function of L 1 , L 2 is the solution of the HJB equation. So we make:
Substituting (20)- (24) into (16)- (18), we can obtain:
Suppose (25)- (27) satisfy L 1 ≥ 0, L 2 ≥ 0, we can obtain:
Substituting (28)- (30) into (19)- (21), we can obtain pharmaceutical firm 1, pharmaceutical firm 2 and the government's optimal benefit function are:
We consider the first order conditions of (31)- (33), and get the first order conditions into (11)- (12) and (14)- (15), we can obtain (5)- (8) .
In this section, the technical level of pharmaceutical firm 1 can be rewritten as:
The technical level of pharmaceutical firm 2 can be rewritten as:
From proposition 1 we can know under the strategy that both pharmaceutical firms do not carry out innovative R&D activities, the R&D investment of pharmaceutical firms is negatively related to the cost coefficient µ, the benefit distribution ratio φ, the discount rate r and depreciation rate θ , while it's positive correlation to the influence coefficient of R&D investment of pharmaceutical firms on the pharmaceutical industry β, the influence coefficient of R&D investment of pharmaceutical firms on industrial technology level δ and the influence coefficient of R&D investment of pharmaceutical firms on the benefit of pharmaceutical industry . It shows that the faster the technology update speed, the smaller the R&D investment of the firm. The R&D investment of pharmaceutical firms will take into account their own input and output, the level of influence of technology and benefits.
From (7) and (8), we can know the effort of government is negatively related to the cost coefficient µ G , the discount rate r and depreciation rate θ , while it's positive correlation to the φ, government's efforts to influence the technology of the pharmaceutical industry β, the influence factor of the government's efforts on the level of industrial technology δ and the impact of the government's efforts on the benefits of the pharmaceutical industry . The government should make relevant policy decisions based on a comprehensive consideration of the input and output of pharmaceutical firms, the technical level of the pharmaceutical industry and total revenue.
B. ONE SIDE INNOVATES ALONE
After the government announced the subsidy policy for innovation drug R&D, pharmaceutical firms will weigh the impact of innovative activities. Among them, high R&D investment and spillovers are negative effects, while monopoly profits brought by innovative drugs are positive effects. R&D activities will only be carried out when the positive impact is greater than the negative impact, and otherwise not. In this section, we will discuss the case of a pharmaceutical firm conducting independent innovative drug development. As firms that conduct innovation drug R&D activities have spillovers on non-innovative firms, we assume that pharmaceutical firm 1 conduct innovation drug R&D, and pharmaceutical firm 2 do not conduct innovation drug R&D. In this case, firm 1 will have technology spillovers for firm 2, the technical level of the pharmaceutical firms evolve over time as described by the following kinematic equation:
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the technical spillover parameter, which measures the positive technological spillover that firm 2 receives from the R&D activity of firm 1. In this game system, the government is the leader of action, and the two pharmaceutical firms are followers of action. VOLUME 7, 2019 First, the government determines the subsidy ratio for innovation drug R&D in pharmaceutical firms. Then, after observing the government's decision, the pharmaceutical firms also make the R&D strategies, that is, the pharmaceutical firm 1 conducts innovative R&D activities, and the pharmaceutical firm 2 maintains the status quo. The government subsidizes pharmaceutical firm 1 that carry out innovative drug R&D, set the subsidy factor to η 1 , pharmaceutical firm 2 will not receive government subsidies without conducting R&D activities.
The objective function of the pharmaceutical firm 1 can be rewritten as:
The objective function of the pharmaceutical firm 2 can be rewritten as:
Proposition 2: Under the strategy of one side innovates alone, the three parties' static feedback Nash equilibrium strategies are:
We consider the first order partial derivatives of E 1 and E 2 for the right end parts of (49) and (50), respectively, and make them equal to 0. We can obtain:
The government can predict that pharmaceutical firms will choose their input function according to formulas (46) and (47) . Therefore, the government can determine its own efforts according to the rational choice of pharmaceutical firms. The local government's HJB can be rewritten as::
Substituting (48)- (49) into (50) . Then, we consider the first order partial derivatives of E G1 , E G2 and η 1 for the right end part of (50) ,and make them equal to 0. We can obtain:
(53) Substituting (48)- (49) and (51)- (53) into (46)- (47)and (50) . We can obtain, (54)-(56), as shown at the top of this page.
From (54)- (56) we can obtain, the linear optimal function of L 1 , L 2 is the solution of the HJB equation. So we make:
Substituting (57)- (62) Substituting (66)- (68) into (57)- (59), we can obtain pharmaceutical firm 1, pharmaceutical firm 2 and the government's optimal benefit function are, (69)- (71), as shown at the top of the page 9.
We consider the first order conditions of (69)- (71), and get the first order conditions into (48)- (49) and (51)- (53), we can obtain (41)- (45) .
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The equation (41) and (43) showed us that the spillover coefficient is positively related to the R&D investment of the pharmaceutical firm 1 and the degree of government efforts. This shows that the government is willing to subsidize such spillover activities, and the greater the spillover effect, the greater the government's efforts. Equation (45) shows that the government subsidizes the purpose of maximizing social benefits. If the pharmaceutical firms cannot make corresponding benefits for the pharmaceutical industry 0 ≤ φ 1 ≤ 1 3 , the government will not share the labor costs of the pharmaceutical firms, that is, government will not provide R&D subsidies.
C. R&D COOPERATION
The two pharmaceutical firms may conduct R&D cooperation to internalize spillover effects, thereby maximizing their own interests and adopting R&D cooperation strategies. In this game system, the government is the leader, and the two pharmaceutical firms are followers. First, the government determines the subsidy ratio for innovative drug R&D in pharmaceutical firms. Then, after observing the government's decision-making, the pharmaceutical firms choose the appropriate level of effort, and the two sides launch the Stackelberg master-slave game. Pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 carry out R&D cooperation activities after seeing government subsidies. In order to distinguish the effect of government subsidies on pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2, the government subsidies for pharmaceutical firms 1 and 2 are η 1 and η 2 , respectively. Since pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 form VOLUME 7, 2019 an innovation alliance to carry out innovation activities to internalize spillovers, there is no spillovers. The functional formula of the pharmaceutical technology level refers to equations (1) and (2) .
There are many cases of R&D cooperation between pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2. We only consider the case where two pharmaceutical firms have technology sharing in the R&D stage but at the other stage, the two sides are competitive. The goal of pharmaceutical firms to conduct R&D cooperation R&D activities is to maximize their profits.
Proposition 3: In the case of R&D cooperation, the three-way static feedback Nash balancing strategy is:
Proof: In order to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, the inverse induction method is adopted.
Suppose there is a continuous bounded differential benefit function
= max
We consider the first order partial derivatives of E 1 and E 2 for the right end parts of (83) and (84), respectively, and make them equal to 0. We can obtain:
The government can predict that pharmaceutical firms will choose their input function according to formulas (83) and (84). Therefore, the government can determine its own efforts according to the rational choice of pharmaceutical firms. The local government's HJB can be rewritten as:
Substituting (85)- (86) into (87). Then, we consider the first order partial derivatives of E G1 , E G2 , η 1 and η 2 for the right end part of (87), and make them equal to 0. We can obtain:
Substituting (85)- (86) and (88)- (91) into (83), (84) and (87). We can obtain:
From (92)- (94) we can obtain, the linear optimal function of L 1 , L 2 is the solution of the HJB equation. So we make:
Substituting (95)- (100) into (92)- (94), we can obtain:
we can obtain:
Substituting (104)- (106) into (95)- (97), we can obtain pharmaceutical firm 1, pharmaceutical firm 2 and the government's optimal benefit function are:
We consider the first order conditions of (107)- (109), and get the first order conditions into (85)- (86) and (88)- (91), we can obtain (77)-(82). In this section, the technical level of pharmaceutical firm 1 can be rewritten as:
IV. COMPARATIVE AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will compare under the different innovative drug R&D strategies the optimal R&D investment and optimal effort of the government and pharmaceutical firms, the level of pharmaceutical technology and the optimal return. Corollary 1: When 1 3 < φ ≤ 1, x comparison of the optimal R&D investment of pharmaceutical firm 1 under different R&D strategies:
y comparison of the optimal R&D investment of pharmaceutical firm 2 under different R&D strategies:
z comparison of the best efforts of the government under the different R&D strategies:
According to formulas (5), (41) and (78), we can obtain:
According to formulas (6), (42) and (78), we can obtain:
According to formulas (7), (43) and (79), we can obtain:
According to formulas (8) , (44) and (80), we can obtain: 
Proof: According to formulas (34) , (72) and (110), we can obtain:
According to formulas (35) , (73) and (110), we can obtain:
Hence, we can obtain: when λ ∈ 0,
.
It can be concluded from the corollary 2 that the pharmaceutical technology level of the pharmaceutical firm 1 under the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone are higher than R&D investment under the R&D strategy of R&D cooperation.
The numerical size of the spillovers parameter λ affects the technical level of pharmaceutical firm 2 under the case of one side innovates alone and R&D cooperation. When the spillovers is large enough, the technical level of the pharmaceutical firm 2 under the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone is higher than the R&D strategy of R&D cooperation. In this case, the pharmaceutical firm 2 may obtain the innovative pharmaceutical technology from the pharmaceutical firm 1 and realize the improvement of the technology at a lower cost.
Corollary 3: Hence
is derived. Corollary 3 showed us that pharmaceutical firm 1 has the highest returns under the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone, followed by the returns under the R&D strategy of R&D cooperation, and the lowest returns without R&D.
This indicates that when the pharmaceutical firm 1 has sufficient R&D capabilities, it is more inclined to adopt the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone.
, the pharmaceutical firm 2 may maintain the status quo.
Proof According to formulas (32) , (70) and (108), we can obtain:
It can be concluded from the corollary 4 that when the technical spillovers parameter is less than
, namely, the spillovers is too low. It is difficult for pharmaceutical firm 2 to obtain technical knowledge from the spillovers in this case, which limits the technological development relying on spillovers. In order to improve market competitiveness, pharmaceutical firm 2 will adopt the strategy of R&D cooperation. When the technology spillovers parameter is greater than
, the spillovers is high. The pharmaceutical firm 2 may easily acquire relevant technical knowledge, thus reducing the R&D cost. In this case, the returns of pharmaceutical firm 2 under the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone is higher than the R&D strategy of R&D cooperation.
Corollary 5:
According to equations (33) , (71) and (109):
It can be concluded from the corollary 5 that the government's returns are highest in the pharmaceutical firms adopt the strategy of one side innovates alone. Combined with the inferences 3, 4, 5, we can infer that under the different R&D strategies of pharmaceutical firms, the total returns of pharmaceutical firm 1 and pharmaceutical firm 2 are ranked V N ≤ V S ≤ V Y when the spillover parameter is small, and V N ≤ V Y ≤ V S when the spillover parameter is large. The returns of government is
It can be seen that the consistency of government and pharmaceutical firms' returns deviates when the spillovers is at different levels. It can be said that the R&D strategy that brings the most profit to pharmaceutical firms does not necessarily lead to the maximization of social welfare. The purpose of the government's subsidy policy is to maximize social welfare. Therefore, the government should introduce policies to guide pharmaceutical firms to choose appropriate R&D strategies under different levels of spillovers.
Corollary 6: The government's optimal subsidy for pharmaceutical firms when adopting the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone is:
The government's optimal subsidy for pharmaceutical firms when adopting the R&D strategy of R&D cooperation is:
It can be concluded from the corollary 6 that when the innovation activities of pharmaceutical firms cannot bring corresponding social benefits, that is 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 3 , the government will not provide R&D subsidies. In addition, the government should give differentiated subsidies under different R&D strategies. Furthermore, the government's optimal subsidy intensity is positively correlated with the spillovers coefficient. When 1 3 < φ 1 ≤ 1, the higher the level of spillover, the greater the government's subsidy intensity. The government's high R&D subsidies can effectively complement the R&D of pharmaceutical firms and make up for the loss of technology spillovers. On the other hand, it also promotes the overall technical level of the pharmaceutical industry by promoting R&D activities of pharmaceutical firms.
V. CONCLUSION
Government subsidies can supplement R&D investment within pharmaceutical firms and strengthen industry knowledge spillovers effectively. Based on the inter-firm spillovers, VOLUME 7, 2019 a differential game model is established to investigate the government subsidy strategies under the different innovative drug R&D strategies of pharmaceutical firms. With the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equitation, the optimal R&D investment, the pharmaceutical technical levels and the optimal benefits are obtained in the strategies of no pharmaceutical firms conduct R&D innovation, independent R&D innovation in a pharmaceutical firm and R&D cooperation. It can be concluded that the smaller the cost coefficient, discount rate and industrial technology level attenuation coefficient of pharmaceutical firms and governments, the higher the efforts of all parties. In addition, in the context of government subsidies and spillover effects, firms with strong R&D capabilities are more willing to conduct independent R&D and innovation activities in order to obtain considerable profits from the monopoly market. Moreover, when the spillovers is too low, that is, when the technology spillover parameter is less than
, the pharmaceutical firm is more difficult to obtain technical knowledge from the spillovers. The development of the spillovers technology is limited, and the ''free rider'' effect is reduced. In this case, pharmaceutical firms may adopt the R&D strategy of R&D cooperation. When the technology spillovers parameter is greater than
, the spillovers is high, the pharmaceutical firms may easily acquire relevant technical knowledge, and the R&D costs are low. In this case, the pharmaceutical firms may adopt the R&D strategy of one side innovates alone. Furthermore, when the innovation activities of pharmaceutical firms cannot bring corresponding social benefits to the society, that is 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 3 , the government could not provide R&D subsidies, and the government should give different subsidies under the different R&D strategies. Finally, when 1 3 < φ 1 ≤ 1, the higher the level of spillovers, the greater the government's subsidy intensity. The government's high R&D subsidies can effectively complement the R&D of pharmaceutical firms and make up for the loss of technology spillovers. On the other hand, it also promotes the technical level of the entire pharmaceutical industry by promoting R&D activities of pharmaceutical firms. The conclusions of this study have important guiding significance and inspiration for the government to implement effective R&D subsidy strategies in the presence of spillovers:
Government subsidies could effectively promote the innovation activities of firms, but due to the government's subsidy resources are limited, government funds should be allocated to the most effective firms. Government subsidies cannot be ''one size fits all''. We should fully consider the positive and negative factors that affect the level of pharmaceutical firms' efforts to better promote and guide the development of the pharmaceutical industry. The government subsidizes should comprehensively consider the R&D capabilities of pharmaceutical firms, and subsidize firms with high innovation ability to encourage independent R&D. In addition, the government should formulate reasonable subsidies for different R&D strategies of pharmaceutical firms. In general, the spillovers may weaken the incentive for pharmaceutical firms to R&D innovation. The government should increase subsidies to stimulate firms to carry out innovative drug R&D activities. The government should combine the level of spillovers and fully consider the R&D strategy of pharmaceutical firms to implement the optimal subsidy policy. Specifically, when the spillovers is low, the government should give higher subsidies to the R&D cooperation model. As the spillovers increase, the government should allocate more subsidies to pharmaceutical firms which conduct independent R&D. On the one hand, government subsidies weaken the negative impact of technology spillovers on innovative drug R&D firms, and on the other hand, they will drive the innovation and development of the entire pharmaceutical industry through technology spillovers.
Nevertheless, there is still much research left for the future. For instance, for ease of solution, this paper assumes that all parameters in the model are not related to time. In the future research, we can solve the differential game model for nondegenerate problems. Additional, with the increase of time, the level of pharmaceutical technology in the pharmaceutical industry system is constantly changing. In the future research, we can study the expectations of the technical level in the system and its stability values.
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